X-Git-Url: http://www.privoxy.org/gitweb/?a=blobdiff_plain;f=jcc.c;h=d0c7d42ed60eaa782b20755fd01f158307a8d35b;hb=e610f7bcab03cc3300dfc56322e0d3a3dc4718f6;hp=d0d535eae91568001cca4d26450e1c27f733d2f7;hpb=bfe28519e62da559f3d37481e8dd82a85e170fea;p=privoxy.git diff --git a/jcc.c b/jcc.c index d0d535ea..d0c7d42e 100644 --- a/jcc.c +++ b/jcc.c @@ -1,4 +1,4 @@ -const char jcc_rcs[] = "$Id: jcc.c,v 1.226 2009/03/01 18:28:24 fabiankeil Exp $"; +const char jcc_rcs[] = "$Id: jcc.c,v 1.234 2009/03/18 20:48:42 fabiankeil Exp $"; /********************************************************************* * * File : $Source: /cvsroot/ijbswa/current/jcc.c,v $ @@ -33,6 +33,38 @@ const char jcc_rcs[] = "$Id: jcc.c,v 1.226 2009/03/01 18:28:24 fabiankeil Exp $" * * Revisions : * $Log: jcc.c,v $ + * Revision 1.234 2009/03/18 20:48:42 fabiankeil + * If the --no-daemon option is used, enable LOG_LEVEL_INFO + * before the config file has been parsed (as we always did). + * + * Revision 1.233 2009/03/13 14:10:07 fabiankeil + * Fix some more harmless warnings on amd64. + * + * Revision 1.232 2009/03/08 19:29:16 fabiankeil + * Reinitialize the timeout structure every time before passing + * it to select(). Apparently some implementations mess with it. + * Probably fixes #2669131 reported by cyberpatrol. + * + * Revision 1.231 2009/03/08 14:19:23 fabiankeil + * Fix justified (but harmless) compiler warnings + * on platforms where sizeof(int) < sizeof(long). + * + * Revision 1.230 2009/03/07 13:09:17 fabiankeil + * Change csp->expected_content and_csp->expected_content_length from + * size_t to unsigned long long to reduce the likelihood of integer + * overflows that would let us close the connection prematurely. + * Bug found while investigating #2669131, reported by cyberpatrol. + * + * Revision 1.229 2009/03/07 11:17:01 fabiankeil + * Fix compiler warning. + * + * Revision 1.228 2009/03/06 20:30:13 fabiankeil + * Log unsigned values as such. + * + * Revision 1.227 2009/03/02 19:18:11 fabiankeil + * Streamline parse_http_request()'s prototype. As + * cparser pointed out it doesn't actually use csp. + * * Revision 1.226 2009/03/01 18:28:24 fabiankeil * Help clang understand that we aren't dereferencing * NULL pointers here. @@ -1891,7 +1923,7 @@ static void send_crunch_response(const struct client_state *csp, struct http_res /* Log that the request was crunched and why. */ log_error(LOG_LEVEL_CRUNCH, "%s: %s", crunch_reason(rsp), http->url); - log_error(LOG_LEVEL_CLF, "%s - - [%T] \"%s\" %s %d", + log_error(LOG_LEVEL_CLF, "%s - - [%T] \"%s\" %s %u", csp->ip_addr_str, http->ocmd, status_code, rsp->content_length); /* Clean up and return */ @@ -1948,7 +1980,7 @@ static int request_contains_null_bytes(const struct client_state *csp, char *buf } while (tmp_len < len); log_error(LOG_LEVEL_ERROR, "%s\'s request contains at least one NULL byte " - "(length=%d, strlen=%d).", csp->ip_addr_str, len, c_len); + "(length=%d, strlen=%u).", csp->ip_addr_str, len, c_len); log_error(LOG_LEVEL_HEADER, "Offending request data with NULL bytes turned into \'°\' characters: %s", buf); @@ -2154,9 +2186,10 @@ static jb_err change_request_destination(struct client_state *csp) * FALSE otherwise. * *********************************************************************/ -static int server_response_is_complete(struct client_state *csp, size_t content_length) +static int server_response_is_complete(struct client_state *csp, + unsigned long long content_length) { - int content_length_known = (csp->flags & CSP_FLAG_CONTENT_LENGTH_SET); + int content_length_known = !!(csp->flags & CSP_FLAG_CONTENT_LENGTH_SET); if (!strcmpic(csp->http->gpc, "HEAD")) { @@ -2564,12 +2597,12 @@ static void chat(struct client_state *csp) jb_socket maxfd; int server_body; int ms_iis5_hack = 0; - size_t byte_count = 0; + unsigned long long byte_count = 0; int forwarded_connect_retries = 0; int max_forwarded_connect_retries = csp->config->forwarded_connect_retries; const struct forward_spec *fwd; struct http_request *http; - int len = 0; /* for buffer sizes (and negative error codes) */ + long len = 0; /* for buffer sizes (and negative error codes) */ /* Function that does the content filtering for the current request */ filter_function_ptr content_filter = NULL; @@ -2579,8 +2612,6 @@ static void chat(struct client_state *csp) struct timeval timeout; memset(buf, 0, sizeof(buf)); - memset(&timeout, 0, sizeof(timeout)); - timeout.tv_sec = csp->config->socket_timeout; http = csp->http; @@ -2803,15 +2834,15 @@ static void chat(struct client_state *csp) log_error(LOG_LEVEL_CONNECT, "Looks like we read the last chunk together with " "the server headers. We better stop reading."); - byte_count = (size_t)(csp->iob->eod - csp->iob->cur); + byte_count = (unsigned long long)(csp->iob->eod - csp->iob->cur); csp->expected_content_length = byte_count; csp->flags |= CSP_FLAG_CONTENT_LENGTH_SET; } if (server_body && server_response_is_complete(csp, byte_count)) { log_error(LOG_LEVEL_CONNECT, - "Done reading from server. Expected content length: %d. " - "Actual content length: %d. Most recently received: %d.", + "Done reading from server. Expected content length: %llu. " + "Actual content length: %llu. Most recently received: %d.", csp->expected_content_length, byte_count, len); len = 0; /* @@ -2822,6 +2853,8 @@ static void chat(struct client_state *csp) } #endif /* FEATURE_CONNECTION_KEEP_ALIVE */ + timeout.tv_sec = csp->config->socket_timeout; + timeout.tv_usec = 0; n = select((int)maxfd+1, &rfds, NULL, NULL, &timeout); if (n == 0) @@ -2925,7 +2958,7 @@ static void chat(struct client_state *csp) log_error(LOG_LEVEL_CONNECT, "Looks like we reached the end of the last chunk. " "We better stop reading."); - csp->expected_content_length = byte_count + (size_t)len; + csp->expected_content_length = byte_count + (unsigned long long)len; csp->flags |= CSP_FLAG_CONTENT_LENGTH_SET; } } @@ -2994,7 +3027,8 @@ static void chat(struct client_state *csp) } if (write_socket(csp->cfd, hdr, strlen(hdr)) - || write_socket(csp->cfd, p != NULL ? p : csp->iob->cur, csp->content_length)) + || write_socket(csp->cfd, + ((p != NULL) ? p : csp->iob->cur), (size_t)csp->content_length)) { log_error(LOG_LEVEL_ERROR, "write modified content to client failed: %E"); freez(hdr); @@ -3042,7 +3076,7 @@ static void chat(struct client_state *csp) if (add_to_iob(csp, buf, len)) { size_t hdrlen; - int flushed; + long flushed; log_error(LOG_LEVEL_INFO, "Flushing header and buffers. Stepping back from filtering."); @@ -3078,7 +3112,7 @@ static void chat(struct client_state *csp) * we just flushed. len will be added a few lines below, * hdrlen doesn't matter for LOG_LEVEL_CLF. */ - byte_count = (size_t)flushed; + byte_count = (unsigned long long)flushed; freez(hdr); content_filter = NULL; server_body = 1; @@ -3093,7 +3127,7 @@ static void chat(struct client_state *csp) return; } } - byte_count += (size_t)len; + byte_count += (unsigned long long)len; continue; } else @@ -3135,11 +3169,11 @@ static void chat(struct client_state *csp) * Since we have to wait for more from the server before * we can parse the headers we just continue here. */ - int header_offset = csp->iob->cur - header_start; + long header_offset = csp->iob->cur - header_start; assert(csp->iob->cur >= header_start); - byte_count += (size_t)(len - header_offset); + byte_count += (unsigned long long)(len - header_offset); log_error(LOG_LEVEL_CONNECT, "Continuing buffering headers. " - "byte_count: %d. header_offset: %d. len: %d.", + "byte_count: %llu. header_offset: %d. len: %d.", byte_count, header_offset, len); continue; } @@ -3239,7 +3273,7 @@ static void chat(struct client_state *csp) return; } - byte_count += (size_t)len; + byte_count += (unsigned long long)len; } else { @@ -3247,9 +3281,9 @@ static void chat(struct client_state *csp) * XXX: the header lenght should probably * be calculated by get_server_headers(). */ - int header_length = csp->iob->cur - header_start; + long header_length = csp->iob->cur - header_start; assert(csp->iob->cur > header_start); - byte_count += (size_t)(len - header_length); + byte_count += (unsigned long long)(len - header_length); } /* we're finished with the server's header */ @@ -3289,13 +3323,13 @@ static void chat(struct client_state *csp) && (csp->expected_content_length != byte_count)) { log_error(LOG_LEVEL_CONNECT, - "Received %d bytes while expecting %d.", + "Received %llu bytes while expecting %llu.", byte_count, csp->expected_content_length); mark_server_socket_tainted(csp); } #endif - log_error(LOG_LEVEL_CLF, "%s - - [%T] \"%s\" 200 %d", + log_error(LOG_LEVEL_CLF, "%s - - [%T] \"%s\" 200 %llu", csp->ip_addr_str, http->ocmd, csp->content_length); } @@ -3660,6 +3694,7 @@ int main(int argc, const char *argv[]) else if (strcmp(argv[argc_pos], "--no-daemon" ) == 0) { + set_debug_level(LOG_LEVEL_FATAL | LOG_LEVEL_ERROR | LOG_LEVEL_INFO); no_daemon = 1; } @@ -3875,8 +3910,8 @@ int main(int argc, const char *argv[]) } #endif /* 1 */ /* - * stderr (fd 2) will be closed later on, when the - * log file has been parsed. + * stderr (fd 2) will be closed later on, + * when the config file has been parsed. */ close( 0 );