X-Git-Url: http://www.privoxy.org/gitweb/?a=blobdiff_plain;f=filters.c;h=18ef5b35a5f1669bbe50645e3bb6d17df19918ac;hb=aa6ce89b0a708175c8ebeefe599aba5431841d7a;hp=4a959751baf995b11e5a569ca0d89953c38f2af4;hpb=b8e4d2f10d54ba6e020c89f7b980062bc3ab028b;p=privoxy.git

diff --git a/filters.c b/filters.c
index 4a959751..18ef5b35 100644
--- a/filters.c
+++ b/filters.c
@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-const char filters_rcs[] = "$Id: filters.c,v 1.105 2008/03/28 15:13:39 fabiankeil Exp $";
+const char filters_rcs[] = "$Id: filters.c,v 1.112 2009/03/01 18:28:23 fabiankeil Exp $";
 /*********************************************************************
  *
  * File        :  $Source: /cvsroot/ijbswa/current/filters.c,v $
@@ -40,6 +40,33 @@ const char filters_rcs[] = "$Id: filters.c,v 1.105 2008/03/28 15:13:39 fabiankei
  *
  * Revisions   :
  *    $Log: filters.c,v $
+ *    Revision 1.112  2009/03/01 18:28:23  fabiankeil
+ *    Help clang understand that we aren't dereferencing
+ *    NULL pointers here.
+ *
+ *    Revision 1.111  2008/12/04 18:13:46  fabiankeil
+ *    Fix a cparser warning.
+ *
+ *    Revision 1.110  2008/11/10 16:40:25  fabiankeil
+ *    Fix a gcc44 warning.
+ *
+ *    Revision 1.109  2008/11/08 15:48:41  fabiankeil
+ *    Mention actual values when complaining about
+ *    the chunk size exceeding the buffer size.
+ *
+ *    Revision 1.108  2008/05/21 15:35:08  fabiankeil
+ *    - Mark csp as immutable for block_acl().
+ *    - Remove an obsolete complaint about filter_popups().
+ *
+ *    Revision 1.107  2008/05/04 17:52:56  fabiankeil
+ *    Adjust parse_http_url() call to new prototype.
+ *
+ *    Revision 1.106  2008/05/03 16:40:44  fabiankeil
+ *    Change content_filters_enabled()'s parameter from
+ *    csp->action to action so it can be also used in the
+ *    CGI code. Don't bother checking if there are filters
+ *    loaded, as that's somewhat besides the point.
+ *
  *    Revision 1.105  2008/03/28 15:13:39  fabiankeil
  *    Remove inspect-jpegs action.
  *
@@ -697,7 +724,7 @@ static jb_err prepare_for_filtering(struct client_state *csp);
  * Returns     : 0 = FALSE (don't block) and 1 = TRUE (do block)
  *
  *********************************************************************/
-int block_acl(struct access_control_addr *dst, struct client_state *csp)
+int block_acl(const struct access_control_addr *dst, const struct client_state *csp)
 {
    struct access_control_list *acl = csp->config->acl;
 
@@ -821,7 +848,7 @@ int acl_addr(const char *aspec, struct access_control_addr *aca)
    aca->mask = 0;
    for (i=1; i <= masklength ; i++)
    {
-      aca->mask |= (1 << (32 - i));
+      aca->mask |= (1U << (32 - i));
    }
 
    /* now mask off the host portion of the ip address
@@ -1735,7 +1762,7 @@ int is_untrusted_url(const struct client_state *csp)
    /*
     * If not, do we maybe trust its referrer?
     */
-   err = parse_http_url(referer, rhttp, csp);
+   err = parse_http_url(referer, rhttp, REQUIRE_PROTOCOL);
    if (err)
    {
       return 1;
@@ -1768,7 +1795,7 @@ int is_untrusted_url(const struct client_state *csp)
                /* since this path points into a user's home space
                 * be sure to include this spec in the trustfile.
                 */
-               int path_len = path_end - path; /* save offset */
+               long path_len = path_end - path; /* save offset */
                path = strdup(path); /* Copy string */
                if (path != NULL)
                {
@@ -2070,12 +2097,6 @@ static char *gif_deanimate_response(struct client_state *csp)
  * Description :  Decides which content filter function has
  *                to be applied (if any).
  *
- *                XXX: Doesn't handle filter_popups()
- *                because of the different prototype. Probably
- *                we should ditch filter_popups() anyway, it's
- *                even less reliable than popup blocking based
- *                on pcrs filters.
- *
  * Parameters  :
  *          1  :  csp = Current client state (buffers, headers, etc...)
  *
@@ -2171,7 +2192,7 @@ static jb_err remove_chunked_transfer_coding(char *buffer, size_t *size)
       return JB_ERR_PARSE;
    }
 
-   while (chunksize > 0)
+   while (chunksize > 0U)
    {
       if (NULL == (from_p = strstr(from_p, "\r\n")))
       {
@@ -2181,7 +2202,9 @@ static jb_err remove_chunked_transfer_coding(char *buffer, size_t *size)
 
       if ((newsize += chunksize) >= *size)
       {
-         log_error(LOG_LEVEL_ERROR, "Chunksize exceeds buffer in  \"chunked\" transfer coding");
+         log_error(LOG_LEVEL_ERROR,
+            "Chunk size %d exceeds buffer size %d in  \"chunked\" transfer coding",
+            chunksize, *size);
          return JB_ERR_PARSE;
       }
       from_p += 2;
@@ -2459,6 +2482,7 @@ const static struct forward_spec *get_forward_override_settings(struct client_st
       log_error(LOG_LEVEL_FATAL,
          "can't allocate memory for forward-override{%s}", forward_override_line);
       /* Never get here - LOG_LEVEL_FATAL causes program exit */
+      return NULL;
    }
 
    vec_count = ssplit(forward_settings, " \t", vec, SZ(vec), 1, 1);
@@ -2498,7 +2522,7 @@ const static struct forward_spec *get_forward_override_settings(struct client_st
          if (NULL != (socks_proxy = strchr(fwd->gateway_host, ':')))
          {
             *socks_proxy++ = '\0';
-            fwd->gateway_port = strtol(socks_proxy, NULL, 0);
+            fwd->gateway_port = (int)strtol(socks_proxy, NULL, 0);
          }
 
          if (fwd->gateway_port <= 0)
@@ -2525,7 +2549,7 @@ const static struct forward_spec *get_forward_override_settings(struct client_st
       if (NULL != (http_parent = strchr(fwd->forward_host, ':')))
       {
          *http_parent++ = '\0';
-         fwd->forward_port = strtol(http_parent, NULL, 0);
+         fwd->forward_port = (int)strtol(http_parent, NULL, 0);
       }
 
       if (fwd->forward_port <= 0)